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WHY SALMAN IS A GAME-CHANGER FOR
THE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY
KENDALL R. PAULEY*
For decades, the political intelligence (PI) industry—an expert network of
lobbyists and lawyers residing in Washington, D.C.—leveraged their personal
connections to extract information from the government and then sell it to
securities traders who could convert this insider-knowledge into substantial
profits. This practice has evaded liability by exploiting two requirements for
tipper-tippee liability: a lack of fiduciary duty owed by government employees
and an absence of a pecuniary exchange between government sources and the PI
operative. However, this Comment argues that now, the STOCK Act and
Salman places the PI industry back within the scope of securities prohibitions.
Although using analytics to inform investment decisions is a legal and
essential component to the functioning of our financial markets, the analyzed
information cannot be material, nonpublic information gathered in breach of a
fiduciary duty. The PI industry claims to only gather and analyze publicly
available information; however, it is clear from market data and government
investigations that PI operatives utilize their personal connections and
relationships to extract trading tips from government employees.
This practice may have been legally permissible in the past, but the
combination of the STOCK Act and Salman now places some PI gathering
technique in jeopardy. First, the STOCK Act explicitly imputed a fiduciary duty
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Professor Lawrence Greenberg for teaching me Securities Regulation and for sharing
his expertise and passion for securities law. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to my
loving wife, Tish Russell Pauley, whose love, intellect, and support has propelled me
through law school and beyond.
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to government employees. Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Salman v. United States—rejecting the “pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature” exchange requirement from the Dirks personal gain test—impacts the
PI industry. Salman reaffirmed Dirks in that the personal gain requirement
could be satisfied by only the personal relationship between a tipper and a tippee,
such as a friendship.
This Comment analyzes the current state of the personal gain requirement
after Salman and applies that analysis to likely scenarios confronting a PI
operative. This Comment argues that, after the STOCK Act and Salman, some
PI practices likely violate securities laws. Consequently, PI firms ought to
evaluate their information gathering techniques, and hedge funds that consume
PI should adopt new compliance procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 2005, USG Corp.’s shares experienced a two
hundred percent increase in trading and a five percent surge in
value—an unheard of growth in the usual day-to-day of Wall Street.1
Yet oddly, USG, a building material supplier, had not released new
financial information or public statements into the marketplace that
day, which is the usual cause of high increases or decreases in trading.2
If it is not the usual cause, a random flurry of excessive trading is
typically a telltale sign of corporate insiders exploiting business
information for their own personal gain; however, this time, the
information emanated not from the boardroom but from Capitol Hill.
The day after the surge in trading, it became clear that the
information had emerged from private discussions regarding a
potential congressional bill when Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (RTN) promised a Senate vote on a bill that would create a public trust
fund for asbestos liability claims.3 Such a fund had the potential to
eliminate USG’s exposure to more than $3 billion of liability claims.4
Although Frist claimed that an investigation yielded no evidence of any
illicit communications by his staff, political intelligence (PI)
operatives5—whose job is to collect information from government
officials to then sell for profit—somehow extracted the material,
nonpublic information and sold it to their clientele, hedge funds.6
Those clients quickly capitalized on the information, precipitating the
increase in the trading volume and reaping significant profits.7
1. Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in
Washington,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
8,
2006,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116554698892944296. A stock listed on the S&P 500
during 2012 had a normal daily volatility of 0.7%. See Morgan Housel, Is Today’s Market
More Volatile than in the Past?, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 22, 2016, 10:34 AM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/22/is-todays-market-morevolatile-than-in-the-past.aspx.
2. Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Dec. 26, 2005, at 42.
3. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1.
4. Assoc. Press, USG to Settle Suits Related to Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/business/usg-to-settle-suits-related-toasbestos.html.
5. See infra Section IV.A (describing the scope of PI operations).
6. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (suggesting a relation between the
dramatic stock price increases and Senator Frist’s announcement).
7. Meng Gao & Jiekun Huang, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed Trading by
Hedge Fund Managers, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 521, 522 (2016) (indicating that traders who
were guided by political intelligence traded before the announcement).
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More than a decade later, this asbestos insider trading scheme
remains relevant because it exemplifies the lucrative market for PI.
The PI industry has avoided liability from their most nefarious acts by
exploiting two gaps in tipper-tippee insider trading prohibitions:
(1) the lack of a fiduciary duty for government employees and (2) the
legal requirement that there must be a pecuniary personal benefit.
However, the enactment of a relatively new statute and a recent
change in jurisprudence now fulfill these two missing elements.8 First,
Congress enacted the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
(STOCK Act) in 2012 as a response to scandals concerning
congressional members,9 and this Act imputes a fiduciary duty to
government employees. Second, in securities law, impermissible
gifting of material, nonpublic information previously required a
reciprocal “personal benefit” with the prospect of a pecuniary gain or
similar nature.10 But on December 6, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Salman v. United States11 rejected this requirement and held that a
“personal gain” to a tipper may be inferred merely from the personal
relationship between the tipper and tippee.12 Together, the STOCK
Act and Salman now encompass all those who utilize their personal
connections to gather material, nonpublic information from
government insiders—namely, the PI industry.13
This Comment argues that the personal gain requirement
articulated in Salman, in connection with the STOCK Act, will curtail
8. Similar to the asbestos trading scheme, on April 2, 2013, trading within the
health-care insurer industry experienced a 3.7% to 5.5% increase in the final minutes
of trading. Brody Mullins, Grassley Wants Answers on ‘Political Intelligence,’ WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 4, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/04/04/grassley-wantsanswers-on-political-intelligence. An hour after the markets closed, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services publicly announced “a change in how the
government pays private insurers to run Medicare health plans for seniors and the
disabled.” Id. In the end, traders profited approximately $662 million from the receipt
of insider government information. Id.
9. Deirdre Walsh, Obama Signs STOCK Act to Address “Deficit of Trust” in Washington,
CNN (Apr. 4, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/politics/stock-actsigning/index.html.
10. A tipper is a person who conveys material, nonpublic information to a tippee.
A tippee is a person who receives material, nonpublic information. Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1983).
11. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
12. Id. at 425 (holding that “a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just
a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is enough to prove securities fraud”).
13. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 3–
4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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PI operatives’ ability to gather information from the government
through insider tactics. As a result, PI firms will need to rely only on
public information and analytics, and hedge funds, the predominant
consumers of PI, should be wary and implement prophylactic
measures to avoid insider trading liability. Further, this Comment
argues that the recent United States v. Martoma14 decision from the
Second Circuit is inconsistent with Salman. Therefore, this Comment
serves as a guide for the courts to continue to conceptualize and
identify factors within a close personal relationship between a tipper
and tippee. Part I explores the origins of insider trading, and Part II
discusses the circuit split leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Salman. Part III then surveys case law to identify factors, without the
presence of any direct pecuniary gain, in a tipper-tippee relationship
that satisfy the post-Salman personal gain requirement. Part IV
introduces and explains the STOCK Act and the PI industry. Finally,
Part V analyzes the PI industry and determines whether, and under
what circumstances, some of the industry’s tactics violate securities laws
in the wake of the STOCK Act and the Salman decision.
I. THE STATE OF INSIDER TRADING
Insider trading prohibitions spring largely from judicial decisions
construing the anti-fraud securities provisions rather than from
statutory or regulatory developments.15 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforce these
prohibitions through enforcement actions and criminal
prosecutions.16 Although the SEC is the principle securities market
regulator, often federal prosecutors also enforce the most egregious
instances of insider trading; thus the SEC and DOJ are both the
catalysts for developing federal insider trading jurisprudence.17
The SEC commenced the first insider trading enforcement as a
response to fraudsters who originated from within a company and
exploited the company’s stockholders.18 However, the SEC later
sought to fulfill its mandate under the Securities Act of 1933 (“the ’33

14. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
15. See infra Section I.A (outlining the foundation and evolution of U.S. securities laws).
16. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Law,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 154 (2012).
17. Id.
18. See infra Section I.B (exploring the motivations and intent behind the adoption
of insider trading laws).
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Act”)19 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ’34 Act”)20 to
protect investors by expanding the scope of liability to fraudsters acting
beyond the boardroom.21 Accordingly, the government22 advanced
several theories of liability with mixed success to reach the outer
bounds of statutory prohibitions on insider trading.23 In that vein, one
of the major theories the SEC promoted focused on capturing those
who trade on information provided to them through a tip in exchange
for a personal benefit.24 Insider trading laws are thus critical to the
integrity of the securities markets because they act as a deterrent to
would-be fraudsters, including those lurking within the PI industry.
A. Origins of Federal Securities Law
The ’33 Act and the ’34 Act were legislative responses to the stock
market’s collapse during the Great Depression.25 Concerned with
“ineptitude and/or chicanery” among stockbrokers and investment
bankers, Congress passed this sweeping legislation to restore
confidence in the markets and encourage investment.26 As part of the
’33 Act, Congress created the SEC and authorized it to promulgate
rules to protect the public, maintain fair and efficient markets, and
promote capital formation.27
19. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
21. See infra Section I.B (explaining the implicit prohibition of trading by anyone
in possession of material, nonpublic information).
22. Because of the overlap between the DOJ’s and the SEC’s roles in developing
insider trading liability theories, this Comment uses “government” throughout to
mean either the SEC or DOJ.
23. See infra Sections I.B.1–2 (explaining the adoption and implications of the classical
and misappropriation theories, a foundation for understanding tipper-tippee liability).
24. See infra Section I.B.3 (articulating how the courts apply tipper-tippee liability,
an essential concept impacting the PI industry).
25. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (1990) (arguing that Congress’s intent in passing the
’34 Act was to prevent speculation in securities by drawing security prices away from
investment value, rather than its prevailing use today).
26. See generally id. at 408–13 (detailing the downfall of the market throughout the
1920s and explaining that “[f]or Congress[,] . . . short selling was the chief villain” and
a main regulatory purpose of the Exchange Act); Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 3–4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
27. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/article/
whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013).
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Securities take the form of various financial instruments and provide
investors—whether they are individuals saving for retirement or hedge
funds—the means to generate passive income with uncommitted
capital.28 The name of an instrument is not determinative of its
classification as a security; courts instead look to the substance and
“economic reality” of the instrument.29 At its foundation, a security is
an investment contract30 in a common enterprise31 that would be
expected to yield profit32 solely33 from the efforts of a promoter or a
third party.34 The primary sale35 of securities allows businesses to raise
capital, which in turn stimulates the economy.36 Moreover, the ability
to buy and sell a security on an open market is essential for capital

28. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (broadly defining a security as “any note, stock,
treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, . . . investment
contract . . . or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing”).
29. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 300 (1946).
30. Id. at 298–99 (“An investment contract . . . [is] a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . .”).
31. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a website
offering investors to pay into virtual companies satisfied the common enterprise prong
because the investors shared “horizontal commonality,” which is “the pooling of assets
from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and risks of the enterprise”).
32. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (noting that
an expectation of profits is one derived from “either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment . . . or a participation in earnings
resulting from the use of investors’ funds”).
33. See SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying
the Williamson factors, which examine the degree of control an investor has to
determine whether the efforts are solely from a third party or promoter); Williamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that there are situations
where a “general partnership interest” may qualify as an investment contract if the
general partner retains little ability to control the profitability of investment).
34. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 296.
35. A primary transaction is when the issuer offers and sells its own securities to
investors, while a secondary transaction is when one investor resells securities of the
issuer to another investor. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION
9–11 (4th ed. 2015).
36. See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP:
PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 1
(Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf
(explaining the importance of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) in allowing companies
to “generate new jobs and revenue for the U.S. economy”).
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formation.37 Recognizing this, the SEC began promulgating regulations
to ensure fair and free markets for securities after their initial sale.38
B. The Development of Insider Trading Prohibitions
Under the ’34 Act, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,39 which
prohibits individuals from engaging in deceptive practices connected
with the purchase or sale of securities.40 The DOJ and SEC broadly
applied Rule 10b-5 to cover a wide variety of deceptive practices.41
Notably, the ’34 Act does not define insider trading, even though the
term is used in the Act to discuss liability and civil penalties.42 Although
lacking a statutory definition, the SEC and the courts construe Rule
10b-5 to implicitly prohibit insider trading.43
Generally, insider trading law prohibits trading of material,44
nonpublic information45 when the trader breaches a duty of trust or

37. Id. at 3.
38. Since the ’33 Act, Congress has passed several laws to expand the reach of the
SEC and to promote capital formation; most recently, Congress passed the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) to encourage capital formation of small
businesses. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (providing that the Act’s purpose is “[t]o increase American job creation and
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging
growth companies”). In passing the JOBS Act, Congress “intended to ease access to
capital and investments for emerging growth companies and through crowdfunding.”
Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 3606, WHITE HOUSE,
(Apr. 5, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/
statement-press-secretary-hr-3606.
39. See C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (prohibiting fraud, deceit, and the omission or
falsification of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
40. Id. Rule 10b-5 also provides investors with a private right of action against
fraudsters. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964) (ruling that the ’34 Act
implies a private right of action and reasoning that “the possibility of civil damages or
injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon [for] enforcement” of securities laws).
41. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”).
42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1 (2012).
43. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983) (noting that inside trading
is within Rule 10b-5 because it is deceitful to stockholders and unfair to the public
without disclosure).
44. A fact is material if it would create a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
45. “[N]onpublic information is information that either is not publicly available
or is sufficiently more detailed and/or reliable than publicly available information to
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confidence owed to the information source,46 the security issuer, or the
company shareholders.47 Thus, despite its title, a fraudster does not
have to be a corporate insider to commit insider trading.48 Insider
trading law implicitly prohibits trading of a security by anyone in
possession of material, nonpublic information in violation of a fiduciary
duty.49 A trader armed with this type of information needs to disclose
it to the public to trade lawfully in that security. Of course, in practice,
this never happens.50 Presently, three theories underpin insider
trading prohibitions: classical, misappropriation, and tipper-tippee.51
1.

The classical theory of insider trading
Under the classical theory, a corporate insider is prohibited from
trading securities based on material, nonpublic information that the
individual obtained through his or her affiliation with the
corporation.52 Corporate insiders include not only officers, directors,
and controlling stockholders, but also all actors who hold fiduciary
duties to a corporation, such as attorneys and consultants.53 The
rationale supporting this theory is that the corporate actors breach
their fiduciary duties of trust to their company’s shareholders by
exploiting corporate information for personal gain.54

be deemed significant, in and of itself, by reasonable investors.” United States v.
Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2012).
46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664–65; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that cases of affirmative deceit, where a device is employed to “trick,
circumvent[,] or bypass,” fall within the ambit of 10b-5).
47. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (affirming that a duty to
disclose arises when there exists a “relationship of trust and confidence”).
48. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
50. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
51. See Kenneth R. Davis, Insider Trading Flaw: Toward a Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
and Beyond, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 53 n.5, 57 (2016) (distinguishing the three current
theories). “Classical theory” is synonymous with “traditional theory.” United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). This Comment refers to it only as classical theory.
52. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651.
53. Id. at 652 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (1983)); Cady, Roberts & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 913 (Nov. 8, 1961).
54. See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 239, 240 (1999) (exploring the debate between whether 10b requires the
plaintiff to provide factual support that the defendant actually used insider
information to execute a trade or whether it is sufficient to find that a defendant
knowingly possessed the information while executing the trade).
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In 1961, the classical theory found its footing when the SEC initiated
an administrative proceeding against Cady, Roberts & Co.55 In Cady,
Roberts & Co.,56 the SEC held both a director of a company and his
broker liable for insider trading after the director ordered his broker
to short his shares57 in anticipation of a public announcement
regarding declining future dividends.58 Following its mandate under
the ’34 Act, the SEC reasoned that the defendants deceived the
company’s shareholders by exploiting material, nonpublic
information and concluded that the defendants should have disclosed
the inside information prior to trading in the company’s securities.59
The classical theory continues to be the fundamental rationale behind
prohibiting insider trading; however, it permits insider trading by
those unaffiliated with the company who acquire confidential
information from their trusted sources within the company.60
2.

The misappropriation theory
In contrast to the classical theory, the misappropriation theory holds
liable persons who misuse confidential information to trade securities
if the person simultaneously owes a duty of trust to the source of that
information.61 Under this theory, it is impermissible for the principal
to use information for a self-serving purpose that deprives the principal
of the exclusive use of that information.62 The misappropriation
55. For a discussion on the development of the classical theory, see generally
Comment, Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose, 71 YALE L.J. 736,
747 (1962), which explores the prominence of the Cady decision in providing clarity
to section 10b of the ’34 Act, and Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule
10b-5–The Tippee at Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 561 (1972), which argues that the ruling
in Cady was justified, but left unclear the requirements of tippee liability.
56. Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
57. Short selling is when a trader “borrow[s] shares from other investors and
sell[s] them in the hope of buying them back lower at a discount.” Chris Dieterich,
So, You Want to Short Shares of Snap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:25 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/03/03/so-you-want-to-short-shares-of-snap.
58. See Cady, 40 SEC Docket at 911 (determining that a failure to disclose insider
information constituted a violation of anti-fraud provisions).
59. The Commissioners noted that without the ’34 Act, insider trading may not
fall within the common law notions of fraud. Id. at 912.
60. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980).
61. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
62. Id. at 652. A principal is a person or entity, who by mutual consent, appoints
and controls an agent who owes a fiduciary duty to the principal to undertake an action
on behalf of the principal. See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS:
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 1 (4th ed. 2012) (describing an agency relationship
between an agent and a principal).
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theory extends the reach of insider trading prohibitions by
encompassing individuals who are not corporate officers or directors.63
The Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in United
States v. O’Hagan.64 In that case, the respondent, James O’Hagan, was
a partner of the law firm Dorsey & Whitney, where he learned that the
firm’s client, Grand Met, was going to make a tender offer65 to acquire
Pillsbury Company.66 O’Hagan traded on this information and profited.67
The SEC filed an enforcement action alleging that although
O’Hagan was not a traditional corporate insider, he defrauded his
employer by using confidential information from its client for his own

63. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (holding that the misappropriation theory applied
even though the parties involved were not officers or directors).
64. 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). The misappropriation theory almost never came to
fruition. See generally CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364 (recounting the genesis
and survival of the misappropriation theory in Supreme Court jurisprudence). In
1987, the Supreme Court had initially denied certiorari to Carpenter v. United States,
which first questioned the validity of the misappropriation theory. 484 U.S. 19 (1987)
(4-4 decision), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). Justice Powell drafted a
dissent arguing that the misappropriation theory was inconsistent with insider trading
precedent. Id. (draft dissent of Powell, J.) (No. 86-422, Dec. 10, 1986) (rejecting the
misappropriation theory and arguing that because the petitioners did not owe a
fiduciary duty to the seller of the securities, they could not be guilty of insider trading).
After the draft letter was circulated among the justices, the Court decided to grant
certiorari; however, Justice Powell retired before its rehearing, and his successor,
Justice Kennedy, had not been confirmed in time to join the decision. See CHOI &
PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364. The Carpenter decision was 4-4, which left intact the
lower court’s decision. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364. But see Randall
W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider-Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief)
Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
865, 868 (2003) (arguing that the misappropriation theory is consistent with statutory
and regulatory schemes of securities laws).
65. A tender offer is a corporate takeover technique that involves a broad solicitation
to all equity shareholders for a fixed-price that is typically at a premium over the market
price. The offer is also often for a substantial number of shares, held open for only a limited
amount of time, and is generally contingent upon shareholders tending a fixed number of
units.
Fast Answers:
Tender Offers, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answerstenderhtm.html (last modified Jan. 16, 2013).
66. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
67. O’Hagan purchased over 2500 unexpired call options and over 5000 common
shares of Pillsbury stock. After Grand Met announced its tender offer, shares jumped
from $39 per share to $60 per share, and O’Hagan netted a profit of more than $4.3
million. Id. at 647–48; see also Saumya Vaishampayan, Options Traders Bet on Big Swing
from Netflix, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/
15/options-traders-bet-on-big-swing-from-netflix (“A [call] option confers the right to
[buy] the underlying stock at a specific price, called the strike price, by a certain time.”).
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benefit.68 The Supreme Court applied the misappropriation theory,
reasoning that Rule 10b-5 aims to protect the integrity of securities
markets against abuses by those who acquire insider information from
their employment relationship.69 Further, the Court agreed that the
misappropriation theory is within the penumbra of 10b-5’s “deceptive
device or contrivance” because the trader exploited the principal’s
trust for personal gain, thereby defrauding the principal.70 Finally, the
Court concluded that it would make “scant sense to hold a lawyer like
O’Hagan [as] a section 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm
representing the target of a tender offer, but not . . . the bidder.”71
Consequently, the misappropriation theory expanded the SEC’s reach
beyond traditional corporate insiders.
3.

Tipper-tippee liability
The third theory of insider trading derives from the classical and
misappropriation theories and is important because it reaches
fraudsters who might otherwise escape liability by acting through
others.72 Tippees of corporate insider information are generally liable
under section 10b-5 because they have a duty not to profit from the use
of insider information that they knew, or should have known, was
confidential and originated from a corporate insider.73 This theory of
liability is viewed as a general extension of an “after the fact” breach of
the insider’s fiduciary obligations.74
The Supreme Court addressed tipper-tippee liability in Dirks v.
SEC.75 Ronald Secrist, a former employee of an equity company,
sought to expose fraudulent management with the help of Raymond
Dirks, an investment analyst.76
Dirks conducted an extensive
investigation, discovered the company’s fraud, and then contacted a
68. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648.
69. Id. at 652–53.
70. Id. at 653.
71. Id. at 659.
72. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (identifying scenarios in which
behavior can be excused under the classical or misappropriation theories).
73. See Davis, supra note 51, at 77 (arguing that securities laws ought to protect the
counterparty of a trade by prohibiting trading while in possession of material,
nonpublic information obtained by any methods, thus abandoning any necessity for a
breach of a fiduciary duty).
74. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
75. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
76. Id. at 649 (informing Dirks that Equity Funding of America vastly overstated its
assets due to fraudulent practices).
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reporter to publicize his findings.77 However, before the Wall Street
Journal published the story, Dirks informed several of his clients who
invested in the company that a fraud was afoot.78 The clients then used
the information to execute timely trades, avoiding substantial
monetary losses.79
The Supreme Court applied a four-part test to determine whether
tipper-tippee liability applied to Dirks’s conduct. The four factors were
whether (1) the insider-tipper breached a fiduciary duty by providing
the material, nonpublic information to a tippee; (2) the tipper realized
a personal benefit from providing the information to the tippee; (3)
the tippee knew, or should have known, the tipper breached his
fiduciary duty; and (4) the tippee used the information in connection
with a securities transaction.80 The Court inferred tippee liability from
the insider-tipper’s breach of a fiduciary duty; thus, the Court required
the government to prove that the tipper violated a duty.81 Further, the
Court focused on the information from the original tipper because, if
such a breach exists, this original tip taints all subsequent tippees who
receive the information.82 In other words, if a tipper violates a
fiduciary duty by communicating a tip to a tippee and that tippee in
turn transmits the tip to other persons, the law attaches liability to each
“remote tippee” who knew, or should have known, that the original
exchange was illicit.83
Applying the test, the Supreme Court found that Secrist received no
personal benefit from tipping Dirks because Secrist’s sole motivation
was to expose fraud.84 The Court acknowledged this laudable goal of
exposing fraud and held that such a noble motive was a lawful
conveyance of nonpublic information.85 The Court defined a personal

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 649 (at least five of Dirk’s clients liquidated their holding of more than
$16 million).
80. Id. at 662–64.
81. See id. at 659, 661–62 (“[T]ippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of
the insider’s duty . . . . And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”).
82. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (finding a tippee
liable for insider trading by focusing on the tipper’s breach of his fiduciary duty when
the tipper shared tips with his brother, who then shared those tips with the tippee).
83. See id. (holding that Salman was liable as a “remote tippee” because he knew
Michael, the tippee, received tips from Maher, the tipper who breached his fiduciary duty).
84. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
85. See id. (“We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, had no duty
to abstain from use of the inside information that he obtained.”).
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benefit as “a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings” as well as “a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend.”86 However, the Court cautioned that
deciding whether an insider personally benefited is a fact-intensive
inquiry and thus not an easy question.87
Finally, the Court
recommended that the SEC promulgate additional rules to help
define the personal benefit requirement.88
The SEC failed to heed the Supreme Court’s suggestion and never
promulgated regulations describing the personal benefit
requirement.89 Without guidance from the SEC, courts have been left
to grapple with Dirks’s description of a personal benefit.90
Unsurprisingly, a circuit split emerged.91
II. THE PERSONAL BENEFIT REQUIREMENT
The Dirks personal benefit requirement provided a workable
framework that remained in harmony amongst the circuits for
decades. However, within the past few years, this area of the law has
been in flux. Starting in 2014, the Second Circuit added an additional

86. Id. at 663–64.
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id.
89. See generally David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal
Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 565 (2006) (arguing that for misappropriation cases,
courts should require a showing that the tipper was reckless as to whether (1) he or
she would either benefit personally or harm to the information source; and (2)
whether somebody else would trade on the information).
90. See generally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–48 (2d Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the court had not yet “been presented with the question of whether
the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s breach requires knowledge of the tipper’s
personal benefit,” but finding that a personal benefit requires a prospect of pecuniary
gain), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 (2016) (holding that a
personal benefit does not have to be a pecuniary gain).
91. See Carmen Germaine, Appeals Courts Still Lost in Post-Newman Trading Muddle,
LAW360 (May 27, 2016, 11:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/801331/
appeals-courts-still-lost-in-post-newman-trading-muddle
(commenting
on
the
widening post-Newman circuit split and the need for clarity from the Supreme Court
or Congress on the requisite elements and essential evidence to find liability). Compare
Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that the tipper “breached
a duty because he made a ‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative’”)
(quoting United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015)), with Newman,
773 F.3d at 448 (finding that a tipper had to breach a duty and have some prospect of
pecuniary gain).
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safeguard, the pecuniary requirement, to the Dirks personal benefit
requirement.92 Just two years later, the Supreme Court restored the
Dirks personal gain requirement to its original state in Salman v. United
States.93 Ironically, in an about face shortly after Salman, the Second
Circuit eviscerated the Dirks personal gains requirement in United States
v. Martoma by fundamentally altering the Salman decision.94 The
Martoma court held that a tipper realizes a personal benefit when the
tipper merely intends to provide a tip with the intent that the recipient
will trade on it—without examining the objective facts evidencing a
close personal relationship between the tipper and tippee.95 The
Second Circuit reasoned in Martoma that Salman altered the analysis of
Dirks because it emphasized that a gift of information is tantamount to
the tipper trading on the information and gifting the proceeds.96 The
Martoma decision contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Salman
because the Court in Salman expressly limited their holding to only
rejecting the pecuniary exchange requirement, stressed the
importance of the relationship between the tipper and tippee, and
incorporated the reference “trading relative or friend” numerous
times in the decision.97 Consequently, the Salman personal gains
requirement remains good law in most jurisdictions, and the rationale
of Martoma lies on uncertain grounds at best.98
A.

The Newman Decision

In United States v. Newman,99 the Second Circuit100 articulated a more
nuanced reading of the personal gains requirement by finding that a
tipper must have a prospect of pecuniary gain relatively
contemporaneous with the conveyance of a tip.101 This holding
illustrates a problem with prosecuting more remote tippees as courts

92. See infra Section II.A.
93. See infra Section II.B.
94. See infra Section II.C.
95. See infra Section II.C.
96. See infra Section II.C.
97. See infra Section II.C.
98. See infra Section II.C.
99. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
100. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Second Circuit is the “Mother
Court” of securities law).
101. Newman, 773 F.3d at 446.
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struggle to find a logical break in the “daisy chain” of tips.102 In
Newman, the government alleged that two portfolio managers—Todd
Newman and Anthony Chiasson—violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on
material, nonpublic information they knew, or should have known,
could have only come from a person who breached his or her fiduciary
duties owed to his or her employer.103
At trial, the government presented evidence that a group of financial
analysts exchanged information they obtained from company
insiders.104 These analysts then passed the information to Newman and
Chiasson, who executed trades in Dell and NVIDIA stock, earning
profits of approximately $4 million and $68 million, respectively.105
Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed from the Dell106 and
NVIDIA107 corporate insiders, and there was no evidence that either of
them knew the source of the inside information.108 The defendants
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that there was no evidence
that the corporate insiders provided confidential information in
exchange for a personal benefit.109 The Southern District of New York

102. The “daisy chain” problem is where a tip is transferred several times over, akin
to a game of telephone, and the government must prove that the ultimate tippee knew,
or should have known, of the tipper’s breach of a fiduciary duty. Franklin A. Gevurtz,
The Overlooked Daisy Chain Problem in Salman, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 18 (2017),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol58/iss6/3 (acknowledging that there is a
“daisy chain problem” in Newman and Salman, and that the Court must further
articulate how the personal benefit element will factor into illegal tipping chains).
103. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
104. Id. at 443 (“Specifically, the Government alleged that these analysts received
information from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA disclosing those companies’ earnings
numbers before they were publicly released in Dell’s May 2008 and August 2008
earnings announcements and NVIDIA’s May 2008 earnings announcement.”).
105. Id.
106. Regarding the Dell tipping chain, evidence established that a Dell investor
relations employee tipped Dell’s earnings information to a Neuberger Berman analyst,
Goyal, who gave the information to a Diamondback analyst, Tortora. Tortora relayed
the information to Newman and a Level Global analyst, Adondakis. Chiasson then
received the information from Adondakis, “making Newman and Chiasson three and
four levels removed from the inside tipper, respectively.” Id.
107. For the NVIDA tipping chain, Choi, an employee of NVIDIA’s financial unit,
attended church with Lim. Choi tipped Lim, who then passed the information to his
co-defendant, Kuo, an analyst at Whittier Trust. Kuo then circulated the information
to the group of analyst friends, including Tortora and Adondakis. They in turn gave
the information to Newman and Chiasson—making Newman and Chiasson four levels
removed from the inside tippers. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 444.
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denied the defendants’ motion and instructed jurors that if they found
“that the ‘defendants traded on material, nonpublic information they
knew insiders had disclosed in breach of a duty of confidentiality,’” the
jurors could find the defendants guilty.110 The jury convicted Newman
and Chiasson on all counts.111
The Second Circuit overturned the jury verdict on the ground that
the jury instruction was erroneous.112 The court held that a tippee
could only be liable if (1) the tipper breached a fiduciary duty;113
(2) the tipper received a personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure;
and (3) the tippee knew, or should have known, of the breach.114
Amplifying the personal benefit prong, the Second Circuit held that
there must be a “meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents
at least a potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”115
Newman sparked a debate among the securities bar.116 Some
commentators praised Newman as an appropriate counterweight to the
growing zealous prosecutions against securities traders alleged to have
benefited from insider information.117 Other commenters argued that

110. Id. at 444, 447 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 444.
112. Id. at 442.
113. Id. at 447; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (noting
that there is a “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information”).
114. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447.
115. Id. at 452 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d
Cir. 2013) (holding that the exchange between an insider and the recipient should
take the form of a “quid pro quo” to properly confer a benefit)).
116. See Reed Harasimowicz, Note, Nothing New, Man!—The Second Circuit’s
Clarification of Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Newman Comes at a Critical
Juncture in the Evolution of Insider Trading, 57 B.C. L. REV. 765, 787–88 (2016) (arguing
that Newman was consistent with precedent and served to rein in prosecutorial
overreach). Compare Tebsy Paul, Comment, Friends with Benefits: Analyzing the
Implications of United States v. Newman for the Future of Insider Trading, 5 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 109, 109–10 (2015) (agreeing that the Newman decision was proper and that the
broad interpretation of 10b-5 has damaged the overall efficiency of the market by
limiting the incentives of market participants to obtain information and make
informed trading decisions), with Laura Palk, Ignorance Is Bliss: Should Lack of Personal
Benefit Knowledge Immunize Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 147 (2016)
(critiquing the Newman decision as being inconsistent with Congress’s intent to
empower the SEC with broad discretion to define securities fraud).
117. See Opinion, Accountability for Preet Bharara, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2016, 7:11
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/accountability-for-preet-bharara-1457655074
(summarizing the Southern District of New York’s denial of the government’s motion to
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Congress intended the ’34 Act to protect the public interest by allowing
the SEC to broadly define securities fraud.118 Newman had at least two
reverberations: first, it added an additional qualifier to Dirks’s personal
gain requirement; and second, it precipitated a number of challenges
to earlier insider trading convictions.119
B.

The Salman Decision

While the government had challenged Newman following the
Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, which
left the Second Circuit’s decision in place.120 Then, just one year later,
the Ninth Circuit in Salman addressed the same issue of personal gain
within the context of tipper-tippee 10b-5 liability.121 The Supreme
Court’s unanimous decision in Salman revitalized the broad holding in
Dirks and reaffirmed the power of the SEC to regulate the markets.122
Unlike Newman, the tipping chain in Salman was intra-family.123 In
2002, Bassam Salman’s future brother-in-law, Maher Kara, joined

dismiss an alleged malicious prosecution case brought by a hedge fund manager against
former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara; the hedge fund manager’s previous securities
conviction was reversed by the Second Circuit for lack of evidence of wrongdoing).
118. See Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 833, 834 (2016) (critiquing the Newman decision because it unduly strained
prosecutors and limited the SEC’s broad interpretation that allowed prosecutors to
enforce the laws and encourage efficient markets).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 21 F. Supp. 3d 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(denying Michael Steinberg’s motion for acquittal after a jury in the Southern District
of New York found Steinberg, a former portfolio manager of SAC Capital Advisors who
was in the same tipping chain as Newman, guilty of reaping $1.9 million in illegal
profits; the court sentenced him to three-and-a-half years in prison); see also Ahiza
Garcia & Evan Perez, Insider Trading Charges Dismissed Against Michael Steinberg, 6 Others,
CNN (Oct. 22, 2015, 8:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/22/news/michaelsteinberg-insider-trading-charges-dismissed (dismissing Steinberg’s conviction
because the Second Circuit found that the tipping chain in Newman did not amount
to an illegal tip under the pecuniary gain requirement).
120. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
121. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S.
Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
122. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424 (holding that the court properly applied Dirks);
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (concluding that the defendant had no duty to
abstain from use of inside information because he lacked a connection to the
corporate insider and there were no objective facts or circumstances that the insider
received a personal benefit).
123. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423–24.
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Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group and began to share
his job experiences with his older brother, Michael Kara.124 Between
2004 and 2007, Mahar discussed various aspects of his job, including
pending mergers and acquisitions, several times with Michael, whom
he suspected was trading on the information.125 During this time,
Salman and Michael grew closer to each other,126 and Michael began
to pass tips he received from Mahar along to Salman.127 At trial,
brokerage records revealed that Michael and Salman’s trading
patterns matched one another, yielding a profit of over $1.5 million.128
The trial testimony revealed a “very close relationship” between the
two Kara brothers.129 Michael was the best man at Maher’s wedding to
Salman’s sister, and Mahar testified that he tipped Michael to “help
him.”130 Michael, though, never reciprocated with any financial benefit
to Mahar.131 Trial testimony highlighted the interconnectedness among
Salman, Michael, and Mahar and showed that Salman knew that the
tips Michael shared with him originated from Mahar.132 Based on this
evidence, the jury convicted Salman of securities fraud.133
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Salman argued that the district
court disregarded the teachings of Newman and did not consider the
relationship between the tipper and tippee, which required “an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”134
Reasoning that Dirks required only a fiduciary breach by sharing
confidential information with a friend or relative, the Ninth Circuit
declined to follow Newman and affirmed Salman’s conviction.135 The
circuit split made this issue ripe for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salman to address the issue
of whether a contemporaneous pecuniary gain is required for tipper-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014)).
Id.
Id.
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tippee liability.136 Salman argued that a “tangible monetary profit” was
a prerequisite to tipper-tippee liability137 and that liability based solely
off of a personal connection would spawn indeterminate and
overbroad prosecutions.138 Seeking to extend the reach of the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Salman, the Government countered that “a tipper
personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading
information for a noncorporate purpose.”139 Therefore, a gift of
confidential information to anyone would constitute an exploitation of that
information and the tipper would always realize a personal benefit.140
In reaffirming Dirks, the Supreme Court determined that there is no
practical difference between providing an insider tip to someone and
giving that person the profits of an illegal trade.141 The Court noted
that “Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to a
‘trading relative or friend,’ the jury can infer that the tipper meant to
provide the equivalent of a cash gift.”142 In essence, the Court rejected
Newman’s “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” requirement but
notably did not adopt the Government’s argument for liability to
extend to all noncorporate disclosures.143
C.

The Martoma Decision

Drawing on Salman, the Second Circuit used Martoma as a vehicle to
revisit another panels’ decision in Newman.144 The holding in Salman
was narrow and rejected only the need to show that the tipper received

136. Id. at 426 (2016). But see John L. Potapchuk, Comment, The Sky is Not Falling,
Todd Newman: The Ninth Circuit Endorses a Measured Reading of Newman’s Definition of
Personal Benefit for Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Salman, 57 B.C. L. REV. E.
SUPP. 139, 140–42 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss6/9
(arguing that Salman and Newman are reconcilable and together illustrate the difference
between friends and family for the purposes of establishing tipper-tippee liability).
137. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.
143. Id. Further, the Court readily dismissed Salman’s argument that common law
fraud requires the defendant to obtain money or property, and the Court rejected
Salman’s last argument that Dirks’s gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague. Id.
The Court opined that there may arise some factual circumstances where assessing
liability for gift giving will be troublesome, but that it was a far cry from “shapeless . . .
criminal prohibition.” Id. at 428–29.
144. See id. at 428; United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017).
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something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”145 Salman never
addressed the “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement
because it was obvious.146 The tipping occurred between two brothers
the Supreme Court described as “very close.”147 Thus, Salman was a
relatively straightforward application and re-affirmation of Dirks.
But the Martoma case was entirely different. Mathew Martoma, a
hedge fund manager, paid for material, nonpublic information from
doctors involved in clinical trials for a new Alzheimer’s drug.148
Martoma paid those “consultants” upwards of $1500 an hour to report
on the progress of the trials.149 Ultimately, Martoma learned from his
consultants that there were “two major weaknesses” in the
experimental drug.150 Acting on that inside information about the
anticipated results of clinical trials, Martoma traded in shares of Elan
and Wyeth in advance of the scheduled public announcement.151 His
trading averted substantial losses and earned him a $9 million bonus.152
Following his conviction for insider trading, Martoma appealed
claiming that the jury instructions deviated from the Newman personal
gain test.153 In the Second Circuit, Martoma argued that his $1500 an
hour consultants did not receive a personal gain.154 Unremarkably, the
court of appeals gave short shrift to this argument.155
In affirming Martoma’s conviction, the Second Circuit, in a divided
panel, concluded that while Salman did not expressly overrule
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement,
Salman fundamentally altered the Dirks analysis.156 Chief Judge
Katzmann explained that Salman characterized a gift of information as
145. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 80.
146. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.
147. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 81 (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424).
148. Id. at 61–62. Martoma’s portfolio had “buying power of between $400 and
$500 million.” Id. at 61. The consulting contracts expressly provided that the
consultant was prohibited from providing confidential information, but in practice,
this was a mere toothless safeguard. Id. at 62.
149. Id. at 67.
150. Id. at 61–62.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 62–63.
153. Id. at 61.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 73 (noting that Dr. Gilman, chair of the safety monitoring committee for
the clinical trial, provided “43 paid consultation sessions for which he billed $1000 an
hour, [and] regularly and intentionally provided Martoma with confidential
information” from the trial).
156. Id. at 69.
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equivalent to a tipper trading on the information and then gifting the
proceeds.157 The Martoma court reasoned that a gift of inside
information with the belief that the recipient would trade on it was
tantamount to a personal gain because the information was used for a
non-corporate purpose.158
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pooler accused the majority of
eliminating the personal gain requirement.159 The dissent argued that
Salman only overruled Newman “‘[t]o the extent’ that it required an
insider to ‘receive something of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature’ as a result of giving a gift to a friend”160 and noted that Salman’s
close examination of the relationship between two brothers, Michael
Kara and Mahar Kara, was a needless inquiry if the Supreme Court had
rejected
the
“meaningfully
close
personal
relationship”
161
requirement.
Judge Pooler observed that the Supreme Court
emphasized this point in Salman when it qualified the gifting
requirement “nearly a half-dozen times” with the phrase “to a trading
relative or friend”—a strong signal that the friend or family standard
remains good law.162
Martoma reads Salman far too broadly and uses its sweeping
interpretation as a springboard to substantially weaken the personal
benefit requirement. Thus, the line between lawful and unlawful
trading is blurred.163 The Dirks personal benefit requirement protects
innocent actors because it requires the government to establish with
objective facts that something of value was exchanged, whether
immediately or in the future.164 Newman’s “meaningful close personal
relationship” was meant to draw a line between tips that were intended
as a gift versus inadvertent innocent disclosures.165 By focusing on the
intent of the tipper, which can be established through circumstantial
evidence—particularly in civil liability—Martoma undermines

157. Id.
158. Id. at 71, 81–82.
159. Id. at 74 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 80–81.
162. Id. at 84–85.
163. Id. at 86.
164. Id. at 76–78. An innocent actor “is unlikely to receive a benefit from sharing
information unless he or she knows the information is material and nonpublic.”
Further, the rule places the tippee in a better position to know whether the disclosure
is illicit based on the personal connection between the tipper and tippee. Id. at 78.
165. Id. at 78.
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Salman.166
Martoma’s holding that virtually any disclosure of
information, regardless of the relationship between the parties, should
be construed as providing a personal benefit ignores Dirks and
eviscerates the concept of personal benefit as a marker between legal
and illegal conduct.167
Despite Martoma, the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman leaves lower
courts outside the Second Circuit to consider the entire spectrum of
potential personal gain. That spectrum begins with tippers like Dirks,
who gained nothing, and ends with tipper-tippees like the Kara brothers,
who exchanged inside information to get rich.168
III. THE LINGERING QUESTION: WHAT IS A CLOSE FRIEND?
In the wake of Salman, a tippee may satisfy the personal gain
requirement simply by being a close friend to the tipper.169 But what
are the features of a close friendship? The current state of
jurisprudence on this question provides six main guidelines for
prosecutors and practitioners.
First, when examining whether a tipper has received a personal
benefit, courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test.170 Second,
courts generally find that a tip to a coworker or someone on equal
footing in business yields a personal gain.171 Third, when a quid pro
quo is not readily ascertainable, additional social ties between the
tipper and tippee should be explored.172 Fourth, sharing a collegiate
connection tends to be a substantial factor that shows a close

166. Id. at 77. Civil liability requires only a preponderance of the evidence, a lower
standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 73.
167. Id. at 86 (reasoning that the majority’s reasoning “could cover nearly any
disclosure, and thus eliminate the personal benefit rule entirely”).
168. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (citing that the
tipper in Salman personally benefited by helping his brother, but the tipper in Dirks
did not personally benefit by exposing fraud).
169. Id.
170. See United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d,
638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that even if none of the circumstances
standing alone were sufficient, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the
tipper anticipated a benefit), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016).
171. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the tipper
expected to benefit by maintaining a good relationship with her coworker and partner
in real estate deals).
172. See SEC v. Anton, No. CIV.A. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 2009) (finding that evidence of a lack of other social ties, such as social or
personal friendship, demonstrated that tipper benefits had not occurred).
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relationship.173 Fifth, the greater the duration and intimacy of a
friendship, the more likely a relationship will qualify as a personal gain
under Dirks.174 Sixth, if a relationship is merely professional, with no
history of personal favors or any family or social connections, no
personal gain exists.175 Each of these guidelines is explained in greater
detail below.
A.

District Courts Define Friendship

When examining whether a tipper has received a personal benefit,
courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test.176 In United States v.
Riley,177 David Riley tipped his friend Matthew Teeple about several
pending confidential tender offers.178 The Southern District of New
York applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate all of the
surrounding personal benefits provided to the tipper, Riley.179 The
court concluded that Riley and Teeple’s relationship was sufficient to
establish a personal benefit under Dirks. Teeple regularly met with
Riley in San Jose, supported Riley’s side business, assisted him in his
job search, and provided him with investment advice.180 This
amounted to a quid pro quo relationship in anticipation of pecuniary
gain.181 Looking at the symbiotic aspects of their relationship, the
court found that all aspects of a friendship were in play.

173. See SEC v. Clay Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6,
2013) (finding a close friendship where the tipper and tippee attended business school
together, were brothers-in-law, and the tipper was the best man at the tippee’s wedding).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling
that personal gain was found where the tipper and tippee had met as freshmen in
college, talked daily, and had seen each other frequently).
175. See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949–50 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (holding
that the defendant did not derive any personal benefit from disclosing material,
nonpublic information to his barber).
176. See United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d,
638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016).
177. 90 F. Supp. 3d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016).
178. Id. at 182. Riley, the Vice President and Chief Information Officer at Foundry
Networks, stayed in contact with his former colleague, Matthew Teeple, who worked
as an analyst for the hedge fund, Artis Capital Management, in 2007. After Riley and
Teeple traveled to San Jose together, Artis changed its financial position in Foundry.
Id. at 181–82.
179. Id. at 189.
180. Id. at 182, 186–89.
181. Id. at 189.
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Courts generally find that a tip to a coworker results in the tipper
receiving a personal gain.182 In SEC v. Yun,183 Donna Yun, a real estate
broker, provided a stock tip184 to her coworker, Jerry Burch.185 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the relationship between Yun and Burch was
sufficient for a jury to find that Yun received a personal benefit.186
Specifically, the court noted that the two were “‘friendly,’ worked
together for several years, and split commissions on various real estate
transactions over the years.”187 In sum, relationships where one person
relies on another for potential pecuniary gain generally satisfy the
personal gains test.
However, in the context of former colleagues, additional personal
ties between the tipper and tippee are needed when a quid pro quo is
not readily ascertainable.188 In SEC v. Anton,189 Frederick Anton was
the chairman of PMA Capital and allegedly tipped190 David Johnson, a
former PMA executive and shareholder.191 The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania rejected the SEC’s argument192 and held that the trial
testimony failed to establish that Anton and Johnson were friends.193
The court held that Anton did not expect any future benefit from any
alleged tip.194 The court reasoned that the two defendants had no
182. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that a jury could
reasonably conclude that a tipper expected to gain from a tip given to someone the tipper
had worked with for several years and had split commissions on real estate transactions).
183. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
184. David Yun, the President of Scholastic Book Fairs, attended a senior
management retreat where he learned that the company would post a loss for the
quarter. The company subsequently gave a public statement noting a revised
downward forecast. However, before the public announcement, he informed his wife,
Donna Yun. Id. at 1267–68.
185. Jerry Burch purchased nearly $20,000 of put-options on Scholastic’s stock
before the announcement, leading to profits of $269,000. Id. at 1268.
186. Id. at 1280.
187. Id.
188. SEC v. Anton, No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *1, *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).
189. No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).
190. The stock tip concerned an upcoming earnings report and information about
the suspension of future dividend payouts. In total, Johnson avoided a loss of $325,305
due to the alleged tip. Id. at *1–2.
191. Id. at *1.
192. The SEC contended that Anton’s knowledge of Johnson’s holdings and of the
potential negative impact on earnings, coupled with Anton and Johnson’s “long
history and personal relationship,” was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that
Anton could expect a personal gain. Id. at *9.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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social or personal relationship; Johnson had “been to Anton’s home
only once, did not have Anton’s personal contact information other
than his office phone number, and had never received a gift from
Anton.”195 Finally, the court noted that Anton had not spoken with
Johnson following the alleged disclosure, which supported the court’s
conclusion that there was no personal gain.196
Even if the tipper and tippee are not in the same business, their
social relationship can be sufficient to infer a benefit.197 In SEC v.
Sargent,198 Dennis Shepard tipped his dentist, Michael Sargent, about a
merger and did not receive a direct financial benefit.199 Nevertheless,
the First Circuit examined their relationship and noted that aside from
their doctor-patient relationship, their families were close.200 The
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find a
close friendship between them because Shepard “often went to
Sargent for help” with his work duties, had referred over seventy-five
patients to Sargent, and the two of them were generally “friendly.”201
Sharing a collegiate connection also tends to show either the
potential for a future quid pro quo or a gift to a tippee.202 In SEC v.
Clay Capital Management, LLC,203 Scott Vollmar tipped his brother-inlaw, James Turner, who also was his former business school
classmate.204 Additionally, Vollmar was the best man at Turner’s
wedding, and the two exchanged over fifty phone calls during the tip-

195. Id.
196. Id. Unfortunately for Johnson, he settled with the SEC and paid a total of over
$786,000 in civil penalties. Id. at *2. Similar to Anton, Johnson may have also been
able to defeat the SEC’s claims by arguing that he did not receive a personal benefit.
197. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000).
198. 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
199. Dennis Shepard ran a consulting business and learned of a potential merger
from his business partner, Anthony Aldridge, who sat on the board of a company
involved in the merger. Id. at 71–72, 77.
200. Id. at 77.
201. Id. Shepard was a member of the local chamber of commerce and often went
to Sargent to help procure funds for the chamber. Id. at 72.
202. See generally Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 347 (2013) (suggesting that “virtually any ‘friendship[,]’” including
“[t]he simple fact they were college friends[,]” would satisfy the benefit requirement).
203. No. 2:11-CV-05020-DMC-JBC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2013).
204. Scott Vollmar worked for Autodesk as a director of business development and
became privy to confidential information about Autodesk’s financial results. Vollmar
then disclosed information about Autodesk’s interest in potentially acquiring
Moldflow to James Turner. Turner then traded on this information, acquiring
substantial profits. Id.
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giving period.205 The New Jersey District Court held that all of these
circumstances sufficed to establish that Vollmar received a personal
benefit from tipping Turner.206
The Southern District of New York came to a similar conclusion. In
United States v. Rajaratnam,207 the court found that Rajiv Goel tipped
Raj Rajaratnam,208 and Rajaratnam had sufficient personal
connections with Goel to sustain Rajaratnam’s conviction.209 The court
cited evidence such as the two meeting in business school and their
families vacationing together as establishing a sufficient connection for
a jury to infer a personal gain.210 Therefore, classmate or college bonds
tend to be examined closely.
The courts also examine the duration and intensity of a relationship.
In United States v. Evans,211 Paul Gianamore, a Credit Suisse financial
analyst, tipped his friend, Ryan Evans, about three pending tender
offers.212 The two friends were freshman-year roommates at DePaul
University, and they kept in touch through phone calls, emails, and
visits while they both lived in Chicago following graduation.213 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that
Gianamore benefitted from his financial tip because it was made as a

205. Id. at *3.
206. Id.
207. 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013).
208. During his time as head of Galleon Management Co.’s hedge fund, Rajaratman
participated in several insider trading schemes, including one that involved the receipt
of insider information concerning an outside company’s financial dealings. 802 F.
Supp. 2d at 495, 499–500.
209. Id. at 507.
210. Id. at 506–07, 512.
211. 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007).
212. Id. at 318–19. Evans’s primary argument was that his co-defendant, Gianamore,
was acquitted of all charges; thus, no reasonable jury could acquit a tipper (Gianamore) yet
convict a tippee using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Id. at 320.
213. Id. at 319.
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gift to a close friend.214 Similarly, in United States v. Bray,215 John
O’Neill, an executive at Eastern Bank, tipped a fellow Oakley Country
Club member.216 The First Circuit affirmed Bray’s conviction, finding
that the social ties were sufficient to infer a personal gain.217 The First
Circuit pointed out that the two men knew each other for fifteen years,
socialized together at their country club, dined at local restaurants, and
Bray did favors for O’Neill’s son over the years.218
If a relationship is merely professional, with no history of personal
favors or any family or social connections, then a court is not likely to
allow a jury to determine whether there was a personal gain. In SEC v.
Maxwell,219 David Maxwell provided a tip to his barber, Elton Jehn.220
Jehn cut Maxwell’s hair for fifteen years, but Maxwell only knew Jehn
by his nickname, “Al.”221 During Maxwell’s haircuts, they discussed
“family and personal matters, as well as how things were going at
[Maxwell’s company].”222 Concluding that Maxwell did not receive a
214. Id. at 323–25; see also SEC v. Sabrdaran, No. 14-CV-04825-JSC, 2017 WL
2081339, at *1, *3, *9 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (sustaining the defendants’ conviction
because the evidence supported a finding of the defendants’ “longstanding
friendship” as determined by their frequent phone calls, emails, and Facebook
messages to discuss developments in their lives, philosophy, and international travel
plans to see one another); SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682, 684, 692–93
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding the relationship between the tipper and tippee to be
sufficient because the tippee knew the tipper for over ten years; was a close confidant;
was relied upon by the tipper to manage the office; received a $30,000, interest-free
loan from the tipper; and went house-hunting with the tipper).
215. 853 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2017).
216. Id. at 22. The court also noted that the Oakley Country Club in Watertown,
Massachusetts, was a hotbed for criminal securities fraudsters. Id. at 21–22, 22 n.1
(citing United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Parigian,
824 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2016)).
217. Bray, 853 F.3d at 27 (finding that their friendship, along with O’Neill’s
expectation that the tip would help his reputation with Bray, was sufficient for the jury
to conclude that O’Neill shared the tip for personal gain).
218. Id. at 22, 27. The First Circuit also noted that Bray previously extended favors
to the O’Neills, such as gifting O’Neill’s son his first set of golf clubs and a $1,000 check
as a graduation present, and helping his son with internship and employment
opportunities. Id. at 22.
219. 341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
220. Id. at 943–44. David Maxwell was a senior executive at Worthington and knew
of an upcoming tender offer to purchase his company. Jehn, a self-employed barber
of forty-five years, emptied his savings accounts and took out loans to help fund
purchases of stock and call options of Worthington stock; after the announcement of
the merger, Jehn profited nearly $192,000. Id. at 943–45.
221. Id. at 943.
222. Id. at 943–44.

2017]SALMAN IS A GAME-CHANGER FOR POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

631

personal benefit, the Southern District of Ohio granted summary
judgment.223 The judge reasoned that Maxwell did not stand to gain
from disclosing material, nonpublic information because the parties
had no agreement to split profits, held such different “stations in life”
that Maxwell could not realize any reputational benefits, and there was
no evidence of any familial or social relationship.224 Therefore, a
professional relationship that lacks a social harmonic may be
insufficient for a tipper to realize a personal gain.
B.

Personal Gains Findings

In sum, a few general guideposts have emerged to assess whether a
personal connection is sufficient to infer a personal benefit postSalman. First, when the tipper and tippee are coworkers and rely on
each other’s efforts to transact business, a court is likely to find a
personal benefit to the tipper.225 However, if the relationship is merely
professional without any additional social gatherings or reliance on
joint efforts for future advancement, then courts will likely find no
personal benefit.226
Second, with respect to social relationships, those spanning multiple
years and involving inter-family gatherings typically meet the threshold
of a personal benefit.227 Naturally, in these circumstances, the courts
have noted that a quid pro quo situation may evolve over time as favors
are exchanged, such as job prospects for the tippee’s child or future
business between the tipper and tippee.228 Similarly, a fact finder may
infer a gift of information when a relationship between two families is
strong.229 Therefore, the personal gains test post-Salman can be
satisfied because these types of relationships naturally spawn a future
exchange or a gratuitous gift.230

223. Id. at 949–50.
224. Id. at 948.
225. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); supra notes 182–87 and
accompanying text.
226. See SEC v. Anton, No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009);
supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.
227. See Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 948–49; United States v. Bray, 853 F.3d 18, 27
(1st Cir. 2017).
228. See Bray, 853 F.3d at 22, 27; supra note 218.
229. See SEC v. Clay Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-05020-DMC-JBC, 2013 WL
5946989, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2013).
230. Id.
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Further, courts appreciate that friendships forged in college or
graduate school tend to last a lifetime.231 For prior collegiate
relationships, the courts discern a mix of both social bonds that could
trigger the gifting rationale of Dirks—where instead of trading on illicit
knowledge and then gifting the proceeds, one merely gifts the
information—and a professional business relationship that may trigger
the quid pro quo rationale.232 Therefore, prior collegiate relationships
are strong indicia of a potential personal gain.233
Finally, a customer relationship, by itself, is typically insufficient.234
Courts recognize that customers expect a friendly and inviting
experience.235 For example, with a barbershop or nail salon, customers
may be more likely to visit the business if the barber or stylist shares in
pleasant “small-talk” with customers.236 The courts recognize that these
relationships are simply part of everyday commerce and do not,
without more, meet the Dirks personal gains test.237
IV. WALL STREET TAPS K STREET
Insider trading on material, nonpublic information originating from
within the government poses a unique challenge to the prosecutors
and the PI operatives who collect, analyze, and distribute PI to
investors. The PI industry arose when hedge funds sought to obtain a
competitive advantage in the marketplace by obtaining nonpublic
information about publicly traded companies.238 Congress attempted
to prevent government insiders from exploiting nonpublic
information for their own personal gain by passing the STOCK Act.239

231. See United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319 (7th Cir. 2007); Clay Capital Mgmt.,
LLC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *3; United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506–
07, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013).
232. See supra notes 202–13 and accompanying text (providing examples of when
college relationships lead to a determination of personal gain).
233. See id.
234. See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that
additional factors beyond the mere client-professional relationship warrant a jury
finding that the tipper personally gained from disclosing nonpublic information).
235. Id. at 943–44.
236. See, e.g., id. at 944–45 (showing that a barber and his patron engaged in
conversation during the patron’s appointments).
237. Id. at 948.
238. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42 (noting that the PI business started with a few firms in
the 1970s, but after hedge funds erupted, new clients with money started seeking out PI).
239. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105,
126 Stat. 291 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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Although the STOCK Act made several contributions to combat the
corrupt practices of some government insiders, the legislation remains
woefully inadequate to fully empower law enforcement to carry out its
statutory mandates.240
A.

The PI Industry

PI is the information gained through gathering and analyzing
activities conducted by Congress, the White House, and federal
agencies.241 PI firms then sell this information to financial analysts
looking for an edge in the stock market.242 Less familiar to the general
public but well known within the halls of Congress,243 PI is gathered
through several channels, such as “briefings, meetings, committee
hearings, public or nonpublic documents, personal conversations, and
other communication.”244 PI operatives then analyze and sell the
240. See Danielle A. Austin, Note, We the People or We the Legislature?: The STOCK Act’s
Compromise Between Politically-Motivated Accountability and Keeping Congress Above the Law,
42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267, 290–91 (2013) (finding that many provisions of the STOCK
Act lack methods of enforcement).
241. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-389, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE:
FINANCIAL MARKET VALUE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION HINGES ON MATERIALITY AND
TIMING 1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. PI is defined as:
information that is derived by a person from direct communication with an
executive branch employee, a Member of Congress, or an employee of
Congress; and provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client
who intends, and who is known to intend, to use the information to inform
investment decisions.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291).
242. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (reporting that PI firms are “charging
hedge funds between $5,000 and $20,000 a month for tips and predictions”).
243. See Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Buying ‘Political Intelligence’ Can Pay Off Big
for Wall Street, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324660404578202072713156116 (describing the emergence of the
PI industry and the need for regulation).
244. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 4 (noting that these communications are
between a PI firm representative and an executive branch employee, a legislative
branch employee, or a member of Congress). From 2011 to 2012, Elizabeth Fowler, a
top health-policy advisor to President Obama, met numerous PI operatives before a
flurry of healthcare trading. These meetings included one with a former colleague
from the Senate Finance Committee staff, Shawn Bishop, who at the time was a senior
vice president at the Marwood Group, a PI firm, and a meeting with representatives
from T. Rowe Price that was set up by Capitol Street, yet another PI firm. Tom
Hamburger, Political Intelligence Firms Set Up Investor Meetings at White House, WASH. POST
(May 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-intelligencefirms-set-up-investor-meetings-at-white-house/2013/05/26/73b06528-bccb-11e29b09-1638acc3942e_story.html.
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information, typically in monthly subscriptions, to hedge funds.245 The PI
industry is small but lucrative for the lobbyists and lawyers who have the
connections to collect it and for the hedge funds that can afford it.246
Hedge funds are hiring lobbyists because of their existing
connections with Capitol Hill and the executive branch.247 Lobbying
is the act of advocating on behalf of another for financial
compensation to influence proposed government action.248 However,
unlike lobbying firms that have to disclose which bills they are

245. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (describing how hedge funds hire lobbyists
to acquire PI for a large monthly fee).
246. Id. (explaining that Elliott & Associates, D.E. Shaw & Co., and Angelo Gordon
& Co. paid over $80,000 in fees to join a lobbying coalition to receive information on
the progress of an asbestos bill); see also Catherine Ho, Trump Victory Could Mean Big
Business for K Street, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/09/trump-blasted-lobbyists-on-the-campaign-trail-buthis-victory-could-mean-big-business-for-k-street (noting that lobbying firms, which
predominately preside on K Street in Washington, D.C., are anticipating a windfall of
business due to the radical change in agenda between President Obama and President
Trump); Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Hedge Funds Pay Top Dollar for Washington
Intelligence, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424053111904070604576514791591319306 (citing Integrity Research
Associates’ estimate that the PI industry is approximately a $100 million a year
business). See generally Martin Klotz et al., SEC Reaches Settlement with Political Intelligence
Firm, but Does Not Charge Insider Trading, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/11/SEC_Reaches_Settle
ment_With_Political_Intelligence_Firm_But_Does_Not_Charge_Insider_Trading.pdf
(noting how the SEC’s settlement deal with Marwood Group Research LLC, in which the
PI firm had to pay $375,000 for not having policies to prevent the misuse of material,
nonpublic information, may show the SEC’s increased willingness to settle in a postNewman world where it has become more difficult to prosecute PI firms for insider trading).
247. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the lucrative business of PI and how
the hedge fund industry is utilizing it).
248. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A), 1602(10) (2012) (stating that lobbying includes
influencing legislation, federal rules, executive orders, the administration of federal
programs, or the nomination of persons to a Senate-confirmed position). Although
proponents of lobbying argue that the practice helps inform lawmakers in niche areas of
laws in which they may be unfamiliar, advocacy groups on both sides of the aisle have
long decried the practice as corrupt, resulting in legislation such as the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614). See Katharine Q. Seelye, Pro or Con, Lobbying Thrived, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2010, 8:11 PM), https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/proor-con-lobbying-thrived (explaining that lobbying helps parties on both sides of the aisle).
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influencing,249 PI gathering remains unregulated.250 The Lobbying
Disclosure Act (LDA) requires exhaustive reporting for persons who
send information or opinions to Capitol Hill with an objective of
influencing legislation.251 Yet merely asking questions to receive
information is not considered “lobbying,” and thus is not within the
ambit of the LDA.252
PI firms primarily sell their services to hedge funds, which possess
both the capital and human resources to convert tips and predictions
into profits.253 Hedge funds “pursue high-risk, high-yield investments
for wealthy clients”254 and were created as an outgrowth of the
Investment Company Act (“ICA”). The ICA prohibits mutual funds
with over 500 investors from leveraging more than twenty-five percent
of its stock portfolio; this creates an opportunity for investment
companies with less than 500 investors to leverage up to fifty percent
of the purchase price of a stock, allowing these companies to take
greater risks and potentially reap greater profits.255 PI is valuable to
hedge funds because they tend to hold assets for only a brief period of
time.256 Thus, hedge funds have been robust consumers of PI and have

249. Lobbyists must provide quarterly reports that includes “a list of the specific
issues upon which a lobbyist employed by the registrant engaged in lobbying activities,
including, to the maximum extent practicable, a list of bill numbers and references to
specific executive branch actions . . . .” 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b).
250. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42; see also Opinion Desk, Political Intelligence Panel
Discussion Concludes with Recognized Need for Increased Disclosure of Non-Public Material
Collection and Use, BUS. WIRE (June 12, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20120612005322/en/Political-Intelligence-Panel-Discussion-ConcludesRecognized-Increased (stating that several members of the PI industry had a discussion
about defining the industry, the potential need for additional regulation, and whether
PI members should be required to register as lobbyists).
251. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, §§ 3, 5, 109 Stat. 691, 692,
697 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602(8)(A), 1604).
252. 2 U.S.C. § 1602 (8)(B).
253. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1.
254. See id. (explaining that hedge funds buy and sell company stock based on PI
before that information is widely known).
255. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 358–59 (4th ed. 1984) (explaining how the Federal Reserve Board’s rules
limit investors from purchasing stock on margin and its consequence on the formation
of various investment firms).
256. “What sets hedge funds apart is their ability to act instantly on news and to
employ trading options that allow them to make money whether stocks rise or fall.”
Jensen et al., supra note 253.
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successfully used PI to make informed decisions on their portfolio
positions, yielding bountiful profits.257
B.

The STOCK Act

On April 4, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the
STOCK Act, which contained several new provisions addressing
congressional insider trading and PI.258 First, the Act conferred a
fiduciary duty upon all public employees and prohibits members of
Congress and other federal employees from trading material,
nonpublic information.259 Second, the Act provided an affirmative
duty for a “covered government person”260 to publicize within forty-five
days any purchase or sale of “stocks, bonds, commodity-futures, or
other securities.”261 Third, the STOCK Act called for the Comptroller
General, who leads the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and
the Congressional Research Service to conduct a research study on the
practice of selling PI.262 Fourth, the STOCK Act prohibited covered
persons from purchasing securities that are the subject of an initial
public offering.263
257. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that Paul Equale, a consultant for
Gerson Lehrman Group Inc., a PI firm, attended a gathering for former Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), where he spoke with two of the Senator’s leading
supporters who confirmed it would be politically inconvenient for the Senator to allow
a bill benefiting the gambling industry to move forward. Mr. Equale then allegedly
passed the information on to a hedge fund who was able to factor that information
into its position on MGM Resorts International shares. Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam,
Hedge Funds Pay Top Dollar for Washington Intelligence, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904070604576514791591319306.
258. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press
Secretary on S. 2038 (Apr. 4, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/04/04/statement-press-secretary-s-2038 (discussing the main provisions of the
STOCK Act and reaffirming President Obama’s commitment to government ethics reform).
259. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105,
§ 4(g)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1). But see Sung Hui
Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm
Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 870 (2013) (analogizing the legislatorcitizen relationship to a fiduciary relationship and arguing that the STOCK Act did
not substantially change the state of insider trading for legislators).
260. Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 18, 126 Stat. 291, 304 (including members and employees
of the executive branch and legislative branch as “covered government persons”).
261. Id. § 6, 126 Stat. at 293 (setting the reporting requirements after receiving
notice of any transaction under section 102(a)(5)(B) and section 101).
262. Id. § 7(a), 126 Stat. at 294–95 (requiring that the PI Report include a discussion
of six items enumerated in the act).
263. Id. § 12, 126 Stat. at 300.
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At a time when opinion polls ranked Americans’ faith in public
institutions at a record low, the STOCK Act was a common-sense
political decision for legislators and the President.264 The STOCK Act
was a reaction to a series of scandals where the public learned of
congressional members’ alleged insider trading resulting from PI;265
however, no prosecutions arose from these scandals.266 The bill passed
with only two “no” votes in the House and three in the Senate.267 The
STOCK Act passed with great fanfare, yet it did little to change the
business of selling or tipping off analysts to the inner-workings and
nonpublic deliberations of the government.268 The purpose of the Act
is two-fold: (1) to prevent congressional, judicial, and executive officers
from executing trades based off of material, nonpublic information

264. Walsh, supra note 9.
265. See, e.g., 60 Minutes, Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-insideinformation (describing Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) and Representative Nancy
Pelosi’s (D-CA) well-timed and insightful stock purchases during the debate on the
Affordable Care Act and 2008 legislation affecting major credit card companies);
James Grimaldi & Michelle Hackman, Donald Trump’s Pick for Health Secretary Traded
Medical Stocks While in House, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/donald-trumps-pick-for-health-secretary-traded-medical-stocks-while-in-house1482451061 (discussing insider trading of Congressman Spencer Bachus (R-AL), who
made $28,000 from over 200 trades).
266. See Amber Phillips, Why One Expert Says Tom Price’s Stock Deals May Very Well Have
Broken the Law, WASH. POST (Jan 18. 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2017/01/18/why-one-expert-says-tom-prices-stock-deals-may-very-wellhave-broken-the-law (stating that the STOCK Act has yet to yield any congressional
prosecutions).
267. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Tim Walz, Walz STOCK Act Passes House
(Feb. 9, 2012), https://walz.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/walz-stock-actpasses-house (commenting that the passing of the STOCK Act was long overdue);
Seung Min Kim, House Approves Insider Trading Ban, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2012),
www.politico.com/story/1012/02/house-approves-insider-trading-ban-072670.
268. Austin, supra note 240, at 270 (arguing that although the STOCK Act was
necessary to clarify the issue of Congress’s fiduciary duty, it allows too many loopholes
and does not provide any proper enforcement mechanisms due to the lack of access
to trading information); see also Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 283–97 (2013) (discussing how the U.S.
Constitution’s Speech and Debate Clause will frustrate investigations of illicit trading
by congressional members); Tamara Keith, How Congress Quietly Overhauled Its InsiderTrading Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 16, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/itsallpolitics/2013/04/16/177496734/how-congress-quietly-overhauled-itsinsider-trading-law (discussing the legislators’ 2013 amendment to the STOCK ACT,
made in response to security risks that decreased transparency).
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derived from their government jobs and (2) to identify the PI industry to
establish a foundation for potential future legislation and regulations.269
The STOCK Act contributed two new developments to the PI
industry. First, although the law does not formally regulate the
industry, it does acknowledge its existence by calling for the
Comptroller General to conduct a research study to discover its
prevalence within the government.270 In particular, Congress was
concerned about the practice of selling material, nonpublic
information to securities analysts.271 The study yielded several
conclusions from the GAO, including that the GAO could not discern
the extent of the sale of PI to investors.272 The GAO, having only found
two examples during the fourteen interviews with intelligence firms,
could not articulate the full extent of investors’ reliance on PI to make
investing decisions.273 PI gathered using insider tactics—such as private
conversations and correspondence—is bundled with other publicly
accessible information and sold to investors.274
Also, financial
compensation from investor-clients to PI firms is usually not tied to a
specific tip but rather to long-term analysis of an entire industrial sector.275
Thus, the GAO study does not fully address congressional concerns.
Second, the STOCK Act explicitly imputes a fiduciary duty to
members of Congress and government employees.276
This
269. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 2–
3, 7, 9, 126 Stat. 291, 291–92, 295, 297 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
270. Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7, 126 Stat. 291, 294–95; see GAO REPORT, supra
note 241, at 1 (outlining the objectives for the GAO study into the relationship
between political intelligence and the financial market).
271. GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 1 (“The STOCK Act directed GAO to study
the role of political intelligence in the financial markets . . . [and] the extent to which
investors rely on such information . . . .”).
272. See id. at 8 (highlighting the difficulty in determining the extent of the sales
due to the bundling of information and lack of consensus on the definition of PI).
273. See id. (noting that, even though quantifying the prevalence of these sales is
extremely difficult, there are two examples of investors using political information).
274. Id. at 4.
275. Id. at 8, 11.
276. See Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(g)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 292, which states:
[E]ach member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the [U.S.]
Government, and the citizens of the United States with respect to material,
nonpublic information derived from such person’s position as a Member of
Congress or employee of Congress or gained from the performance of such
person’s official responsibilities.
Similar language exists for judicial and executive branch employees in a subsequent
section of the STOCK Act. Id. § 9(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. at 297.
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development is significant because insider trading under the classical
theory is predicated on a breach of a fiduciary duty.277 It extends the
reach of the misappropriation theory to outsiders who acquire
material, nonpublic government information from their employers,
such as law firms or consultants who contract with the government.278
V.

HOW SALMAN AND THE STOCK ACT IMPACT THE PI INDUSTRY
A.

The PI Industry’s Use of Personal Connections May Violate
Insider Trading Laws

After the Salman decision, which reaffirmed Dirks’s expansive
personal gains test, and the STOCK Act, some of the PI firms’ practices
may constitute insider trading and violate Rule 10b-5. PI operatives
who communicate with government officials to gather material,
nonpublic information may be impermissibly leveraging their personal
connections with government officials to gain information.279
Typically, PI operatives are lobbyists and/or lawyers who previously
worked for the government and maintain close ties with their former
co-workers or have other influences over legislators.280 If a tippee
knows, or should have known, that there has been a breach of a
fiduciary duty and there is a personal benefit to the tipper, then any

277. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907,
911–12 (Nov. 8, 1961) (holding that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
the corporation’s stockholders when they traded on material, nonpublic information
because the information was property of the company); see also Martha L. Cochran et
al., STOCK Act Expands Insider Trading Liability: Communicating with Government Officials
Carries New Risks, ARNOLD & PORTER 1 (Apr. 2012), https://www.apks.com/~/media/
files/perspectives/publications/2012/04/stock-act-expands-insider-trading-liabilitycomm__/files/newsletter-item/fileattachment/advisory-stock_act_expands_insider_
trading_liabi__.pdf (advising clients to be wary of communications with public officials).
278. Sara Almousa, Comment, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Relationships
Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1251, 1258–59 (2016) (discussing the expansive application of the
misappropriation theory through the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the theory in
O’Hagan, where a law firm partner violated a duty of trust and confidence, resulting in
the SEC introducing Rule 10-b).
279. See Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Insider-Trading Case Ensnares
Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/
24/business/dealbook/five-accused-of-trading-illegally-on-health-policy-leaks.html
(discussing the investigation into a Washington consultant for selling to a hedge fund
material, nonpublic information that he received from a friend at the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid services).
280. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
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material, nonpublic information must be disclosed before trading a
security.281 To analyze the impact of the STOCK Act and the personal
gains test after Salman, this Part uses a hypothetical political operative
(the “Operative”) employed at one of the fourteen PI firms interviewed
by the GAO.282 With that hypothetical Operative in mind, this Part
explores those factors that may point to a PI operative realizing a
judicially cognizable personal gain on a government tipper.
Our Operative worked for four years as a legislative assistant for a
member of Congress and another four years as a senior staffer with the
Senate Banking Committee. The Operative is a graduate of a
prestigious Washington, D.C., law school and holds a lofty partnership
at a global law firm. The Operative resides in Potomac, Maryland,
where the Operative also serves as an officer of the Congressional
Country Club. With this pedigree, what additional circumstances might
draw the Operative within the ambit of 10b-5? Moreover, when might
a hedge fund that acted on information from the Operative be liable?283
To determine whether tipper-tippee liability applies, a court will
apply the four-step test in Dirks.284 In the hypothetical situation, a court
would need to first determine whether the government official (the
“Official”), breached a fiduciary duty and disclosed material,
nonpublic information to the Operative.285 Second, a court would
need to decide whether the Official received a personal benefit from
the Operative.286 Third, a court would ask whether the Operative
knew, or should have known, about the Official’s breach of fiduciary
duty.287 Fourth, a court would ask whether the Operative used the
information in connection with a securities transaction.288
The Operative would have to obtain material, nonpublic
information in breach of a fiduciary duty.289 In the context of PI,
281. See Cady, 40 SEC Docket at 911 (concluding that the only way to cure the harm
was for the possessor of the material, nonpublic information to disclose the
information before trading on it); supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
282. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 2 (discussing how the GAO conducted its
study by interviewing several PI firms to obtain information about the PI industry).
283. Although this hypothetical uses a hedge fund as an example, the analysis would
be the same for any person or entity trading any type of security with PI. See supra
notes 30–34 and accompanying text (describing the elements of a security).
284. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
285. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 665–66.
288. Id. at 666–67.
289. See id. at 663–64.
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public information includes anything the public can view, listen to, or
read, including public hearings on Capitol Hill or public documents.290
Further, even if a government official breaches fiduciary duty and
intentionally disseminates confidential information to the public,
trading on such information is permissible because the information is
public.291
Therefore, the Operative must first receive nonpublic
information, likely through private conversations and correspondence,292
to be liable for insider trading.
Next, the Official must breach a fiduciary duty in communicating
the information to the Operative.293 Although the existence of this
duty may have been disputed prior to the STOCK Act,294 the statute
imposes a fiduciary duty on government officials.295 Therefore, if the
other elements of Dirks’s first prong are satisfied—namely, tipping
material, nonpublic information—then a fiduciary duty is expressly
breached because the STOCK Act requires covered persons to
safeguard material, nonpublic information.296
Further, to satisfy the remaining element within the first prong, the
Official must tip material information to the Operative.297 Material
information is information that a reasonable investor would want to
know before investing; further, it must add to the “total-mix” of

290. See supra note 45 (explaining the difference between public and nonpublic
information within the context of securities laws).
291. Once a statement is made public, the court will assume, via the efficient market
hypothesis, that the information is priced into the market. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014) (affirming the presumption of the
efficient market theory, which theorizes that a stock price “reflects all public material
information—including material misstatements”).
292. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing various ways in which PI
can be obtained).
293. See supra notes 80–83.
294. See Lawrence Greenberg, A Proposal for Abolishing Congressional Insider Trading,
MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/
01/30/a-proposal-for-abolishing-congressional-insider-tr.aspx (acknowledging that
some experts believe that a duty of trust and confidence and prohibition against
insider trading existed prior to the STOCK act).
295. “[E]ach Member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the [U.S.] Government,
and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, nonpublic
information . . . .” Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(g)(1), 126 Stat 291, 292.
296. All covered persons must not disclose “material, nonpublic information
derived from such person’s position [in the Government] or gained from the
performance of such person’s official responsibilities.” Id.
297. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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publicly available information.298 Prosecuting a single tip is often
problematic because the tip may be insufficient by itself to satisfy the
materiality requirement.299 When the information is paired with other
tips, however, the Operative can draw a material inference that may
yield a rich trading tip.300
The second Dirks prong requires the Official to realize a personal
benefit in exchange for the material, nonpublic information.301
Obviously, if the Operative pays the Official for the insider
information, then this prong is satisfied.302 However, if the Official
provided the information to the Operative without a
contemporaneous pecuniary exchange, the analysis examines the
totality of the circumstances between the Operative and the Official to
determine whether a close friendship exists.303 Given the Operative’s
background, the Official may have shared prior employment, a
collegiate connection, or traveled in similar social circles.
What if the Official currently works for the Senate Banking
Committee and was also employed by that Committee when the
Operative worked there? Would that relationship by itself be sufficient
to infer a personal benefit? Probably not. Here, the Official and the
Operative have a prior co-worker relationship, but unlike the
relationship in Yun, in which the tipper and tippee relied on each

298. See supra note 44 (defining materiality).
299. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241; Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (explaining
how traders were able to reap millions in profits through knowing about an upcoming
government announcement). But see Stevenson & Goldstein, supra note 279 (where
alleged single tips were sold as “consulting fees” to a hedge fund).
300. An example of this materiality problem in the asbestos trading scheme
scenario, see Javers, supra note 2, at 42, would be if the PI Operative received four tips
from different tippers. Hypothetically, one tip may be that legislation of “some sort”
is under consideration. A second tip may be that the Senate Majority Leader has an
announcement scheduled for the following day. A third tip may be that an asbestos
expert was seen leaving Capitol Hill, and a fourth tip could be that a $20 billion liability
fund of “some kind” was being created. Like parts of a puzzle, each tip contains a part
of the picture that is unintelligible, and thus not material by itself, but when pieced
together with all of the other puzzle pieces, the picture becomes cognizable.
301. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
302. For example, in United States v. Whitman, 115 F. Supp. 3d 439, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
2015), a tipper “demanded somewhere in the range of $100,000 to $200,000” per
trading tip. The court concluded that this was tantamount of a “classic example[] of
an actual . . . quid pro quo” exchange in violation of the personal gains requirement.
303. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (acknowledging that “determining
whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure . . . will not always
be easy for courts”); see also supra Part III and accompanying text.
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other for profits and advancement,304 the Official and the Operative
no longer work together. However, if the Official is a member of
Congress and the Operative routinely organizes fundraising events for
Congress, then a quid pro quo scenario similar to Sargent may exist. In
Sargent, the court found a quid pro quo when the parties aided each
other with patient referrals and help with the chamber of commerce.305
Further, a personal gain in connection with a tip no longer needs to
be immediate; the promise of future fundraising by the Operative for
the Official would likely suffice.306
Next, what if the Operative and the Official shared their college
years together at the same institution? While collegiate relationships
can be a strong indicator of a quid pro quo or gifting relationship,307
the mere coincidence of being on campus at the same time is
insufficient to infer a close relationship.308 Instead, a court will
examine the nature and depth of the parties’ relationship.309 If, as in
Evans and Clay Capital, the Operative and the Official communicated
regularly and met socially over the years, a disclosure that was
subsequently traded on would likely be an illicit gift to a friend.310
Evans amplified this point by noting that college roommates, even
those entering different professions, can spawn relationships that
create similar stations in life.311 Consequently, a personal gain may be
inferred from a reasonable expectation on the part of one individual

304. Supra notes 182–87 and accompanying text (explaining that Donna Yun and
Jerry Burch were friendly, worked together for years, and split commissions on various
real estate transactions).
305. Supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 176–81 (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to
examine a personal benefit exchange between a tipper and a tippee).
307. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
308. See Sara Almousa, supra note 278, at 1263–64 (holding that the career advice
was insufficient to establish a benefit and was rather “merely an ‘encouragement one
would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance’”).
309. See supra notes 203–10 (reviewing Clay Capital and Rajaratnam, in which the courts
considered the nature and extent of personal relationships between tipper and tippee).
310. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (holding that a personal benefit is
satisfied when the tipper “inten[ds] to benefit the . . . recipient . . . resembl[ing]
trading by the insider himself”); United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319 (7th Cir.
2007) (affirming the jury’s decision that meeting in college and talking daily on the
phone and e-mail are sufficient facts to find a personal gain); supra note 205 and
accompanying text (commenting that the parties in Clay Capital exchanged over fifty
phone calls during the tip-giving period).
311. SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
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that a favor will be returned in the future—a quid pro quo.312
Therefore, collegiate relationships should raise cautionary flags.
Finally, what if the Operative and the Official were both members of
the same country club? Where objective circumstances point to a
friendship outside of the workplace, courts do not hesitate to put the
question to a jury.313 If the Operative and the Official golf together
routinely and attend club social events, their relationship may be
analogous to the tipper and tippee in Bray who socialized together and
exchanged favors.314 Therefore, 10b-5 liability may attach if the factual
circumstances indicate a close social relationship.
The third Dirks prong—whether the tippee should have known of
the breach—involves consideration of whether the tip was nonpublic
information. The STOCK Act places the public on notice that
government employees owe a fiduciary duty to the government and
the American people; therefore, the Operative knows, or should know,
that the Official is breaching a duty.315 The knowledge element turns
on the issue of whether the tippee knew that the information was
nonpublic.316 If the Operative knows that the information is
nonpublic, then the Operative also knows, or should know, that the
Official breached a fiduciary duty.
The fourth Dirks prong is satisfied only if the information that the
Operative obtains is used “in connection with” securities trading.317
Here, if the Operative personally trades on the information, this element

312. United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that
the personal benefit does not need to be immediate, but rather that the tip must lead
to the benefit, now or in the future).
313. United States v. Bray, 853 F.3d 18, 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding that there was
a “plausible” close relationship between two people who had met in college and
maintained a social relationship).
314. Id. at 27 (affirming the conviction of the defendant because the tipper an
tippee were members of the same golf club, “dined with each other at local bars and
restaurants, and even took each other’s counsel”); see supra notes 215–18 and
accompanying text.
315. For a discussion on public notice, see generally Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of
the Government to Make the Law Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 255, 257–63 (1982), which
states that once a bill has been signed into law and published, the public is presumed
to be on notice.
316. The STOCK Act requires that all covered persons must not disclose “material,
nonpublic information” (emphasis added). Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1).
317. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (requiring that the fraud or deceit occur “in
connection with” the purchase or sale of a security).
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is satisfied.318 On the other hand, if the Operative sells the information to
someone who does not trade on it, insider trading liability does not attach
to the Operative.319 Of course, PI firms service hedge funds and hedge
funds buy and sell securities.320 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude
that PI firms knowingly transmit nonpublic information to entities that
satisfy the “in connection with” requirement.321
B.

New Compliance Challenges for Hedge Funds that Consume PI

A hedge fund may have insider trading liability if it knew, or should
have known, that the Operative satisfied the Dirks prongs. But given
the bundling of PI from multiple sources and the burden of proving
that the hedge fund knew its information was gathered impermissibly,
finding knowledge is a high hurdle.
First, proving materiality is problematic because PI firms allegedly do
not sell single tips, choosing instead to bundle the information gained
from many sources into a single product, usually a monthly update.322
Such bundling makes it difficult for prosecutors to establish that any
one piece of information is material because it was embedded in a
“mosaic of public information.”323 Each assertion may be either
nonmaterial in and of itself or based on publicly available information;
however, those pieces of information in the aggregate could provide a
trading tip.324 Nevertheless, if the government can prove that material,
nonpublic information was embedded within the product, then an

318. See supra notes 56–60 (discussing corporate insider fiduciary duties to the company).
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
320. See Javers, supra note 2 (explaining that the hedge fund industry consumes PI
because hedge funds short-sell stocks and can leverage their positions for greater profits).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
322. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 11 (describing how several of the PI firms
interviewed by the GAO predominately sell their information as newsletters, hourly
rates as services provided, or upfront fees). But see Stevenson & Goldstein, supra
note 279 (alleging that single tips were sold as “consulting fees” to a hedge fund).
323. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Just Tidbits, or Material Facts for Insider Trading?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:56 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/justtidbits-or-material-facts-for-insider-trading.
324. Id. (“[T]he mosaic theory is that each individual piece of information is
nonmaterial by itself: an individual piece of information would not move the price of
the security if disseminated in a public press release. Taken together, however, the
bits of information can form a meaningful mosaic.”). For another example of the
mosaic theory, see supra note 300.
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insider trading violation may be proved because the law prohibits all
trades that utilize material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty.325
Second, the government must prove that the hedge fund knew, or
should have known, that the PI firm employed impermissible practices
to gather the illicit material, nonpublic information.326 This also
presents a challenge for prosecutors because some PI firms have
disavowed insider tactics.327 Such statements would provide hedge
funds with a safe harbor to argue that it believed that the information
was legally obtained.328 But a PI firm’s disclaimer may not afford any
protection if there is evidence that a hedge fund had actual knowledge
of illicit methods used to obtain PI.329 Thus, it would be wise for hedge
funds who consume PI to limit their communications with their PI
agents to only the final product, which ideally would contain both a
disclaimer and a statement of sources and methods. Finally, the longer
325. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 159–60 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding
that Rule 10b-5 does not require reliance upon material, nonpublic information for a
trade, but merely possession of material, nonpublic information while executing a
purchase or sale of a security).
326. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016) (“[T]o establish a
defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, [the government] must prove that the tippee
knew that the tipper breached a duty—in other words, that the tippee knew that the
tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected
trading to ensue.”); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
327. See Brody Mullins, Regulatory Scrutiny Transforms Washington’s Political-Intelligence
Business, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2014, 8:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
regulatory-scrutiny-transforms-washingtons-political-intelligence-business-1403223675
(“Today, instead of seeking information from congressional aides or agency officials,
Mr. Vogel’s firm aims to arrive at policy predictions based on publicly available metrics,
such as campaign donations, lobbying expenditures, congressional voting records and
polling data.”). But see Brody Mullins & Aruna Viswanatha, The King of ‘Political
Intelligence’ Faces a Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-king-of-political-intelligence-faces-a-reckoning-1471530464 (describing how as late
as 2016, David Blaszczak, a PI operative, would gather Centers of Medicare and
Medicaid Services information by leveraging his personal connections with his former
agency, and sell the information to hedge funds such as Visium Asset Management for
steep trading profits).
328. See Stephen Madsen, How to Avoid the Pitfalls of Expert Networking, LAW360 (Apr.
20,
2011),
https://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/
3281473_1.pdf (recommending that clients who retain expert networks should “ask
the expert to confirm that the information can be provided without violating
obligations of confidentiality”).
329. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61–62 (2017) (affirming the
defendant’s conviction even though the defendant received a representation in the
consultant’s contract stating that the consultant was “not to disclose any confidential
information in a consultation”).
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and more attenuated the tipper-tippee chain, the greater the challenge
in showing a link between the hedge fund and the tipper.330
CONCLUSION
Courts consistently ratify the SEC’s core mission to ferret out
fraudsters who undermine the integrity of the markets. Salman
continued this jurisprudence by reaffirming the Dirks personal gain
test. Salman recognized that the personal gain test is an inherently factintensive inquiry because human relationships are intrinsically
complex. Yet this fact-intensive inquiry is not esoteric; the courts have
developed a workable framework to analyze whether the objective facts
of the case demonstrate a meaningfully close personal relationship—
an important due process protection. Accordingly, an inquiry cannot
be reduced to a formulaic test and instead should be left for a judge or
jury to determine when a tipper realizes a personal gain. Finally, as
district courts continue to grapple with the contours of personal
relationships, this Comment attempts to provide a guide for prosecutors
and practitioners to understand the current state of the law.
Salman’s reaffirmation of the Dirks personal gain requirement was
limited in scope and preserved due process protections for the
accused. In contrast, the Second Circuit’s decision in Martoma is
inconsistent with Dirks and effectively eliminates the personal gain
requirement. It allows prosecutors to prove merely that a defendant
provided a tip intended for the recipient to trade upon it, opening the
door for prosecutors utilizing circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.
The Dirks personal gain requirement imposed an objective test to provide
a necessary counterweight to governmental powers. Moreover, because
federal securities laws are a creature of judicial decisions, courts should be
hesitant to eliminate protections for the accused.
Additionally, Congress should revisit the STOCK Act because it is
woefully inadequate in providing the requisite tools for SEC and DOJ
investigators to carry out their mandates and enforce the law.
Nevertheless, the STOCK Act brought attention to an underground
and shameful truth concerning our government. Namely, that too
many government insiders are using their positions of power for their
own personal profit.
Further, the STOCK Act’s explicit
announcement that government workers owe a fiduciary duty to the
American people places government officials on notice that insider
330. See Gevurtz, supra note 102, at 19–22 (discussing the increased difficulty in
convicting a tippee when a trading tip spans multiple persons).
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trading laws do apply to them and that the transmission of insider
information to others can be prosecuted.
Therefore, the PI industry should disavow insider-only tactics used
to gather PI and instead rely upon only publicly available data and
information. The STOCK Act was a clear warning sign to the PI
industry to conform or subject themselves to liability. Moreover, for
those firms who continue to gamble and use insider-only tactics after
the STOCK Act, Salman places those firms within the crosshairs of
10b-5. Hedge funds and other consumers of PI should question their
PI operatives’ tactics and ensure that they comport with the law.
Accordingly, it would be prudent for hedge funds that utilize PI to
inform investment analysts to request a statement from their operatives
attesting to the methods employed to obtain PI. Otherwise, their
fund’s assets may be at risk due to a PI operative’s personal relationship
with a government official.

